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Footnotes
1. If the accused is a “young person” (i.e., 12 to 17 years of age) bail
is governed by the Youth Criminal Justice Act, S.C. 2002, c C-1
(Can.).  This Act contains its own bail provisions, which are sim-
ilar but not identical to the Canadian Criminal Code (see sections
28 and 29).  In addition, a bail judge who decides that a young
person should otherwise be detained can release the accused into
the “care of a responsible person” (see section 31). 
2. Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c C-46, s 515(2) (Can.).
3. Code, R.S.C. 1985, c C-46, s 515(6) (Can.).
4. Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c C-46, s 522 (Can.).
5. Section 520 of the Criminal Code states as follows:
If a justice, or a judge of the Nunavut Court of Justice,
makes an order under subsection 515(2), (5), (6), (7), (8) or
(12) or makes or vacates any order under paragraph
523(2)(b), the accused may, at any time before the trial of the
charge, apply to a judge for a review of the order.
The Supreme Court of Canada, through a series of judg-ments, has had a significant impact on the law of judicialinterim release (or “bail”) in Canada.  As will be seen, this
impact has occurred in relation to the law of bail at both the
trial and appellate level and includes two decisions rendered
this year.  In this column I intend to examine this impact by
briefly reviewing the law of bail in Canada and then illustrat-
ing the significant impact of the Supreme Court of Canada’s
decisions in this area.  
The starting point is that in Canada, bail is entirely a crea-
ture of statute. It is solely governed by the provisions of
Canada’s Criminal Code, R.S.C 1985, c C-46 (Can.) at both the
trial and appellate level.  It also has constitutional status.
THE CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA’S BAIL PROVISIONS-
TRIAL LEVEL
Section 515(10) of the Criminal Code sets out the only
grounds upon which a trial judge can deny judicial interim
release to an accused person in Canada.  For bail to be
denied it must be established that (1) the accused will fail to
appear in court; (2) it is necessary to protect the public; or
(3) it is necessary to maintain the public’s confidence in the
administration of justice.  These grounds are described in
sections 515(10)(a) to (c), and they indicate that:
[T]he detention of an accused in custody is justified
only on one or more of the following grounds:
(a) where the detention is necessary to ensure his or her
attendance in court in order to be dealt with according
to law;
(b) where the detention is necessary for the protection
or safety of the public, including any victim of or witness
to the offence, having regard to all the circumstances
including any substantial likelihood that the accused
will, if released from custody, commit a criminal offence
or interference with the administration of justice; and
(c) if the detention is necessary to maintain confidence
in the administration of justice, having regard to all the
circumstances, including
(i) the apparent strength of the prosecution’s case,
(ii) the gravity of the offence,
(iii) the circumstances surrounding the commis-
sion of the offence, including whether a firearm
was used, and
(iv) the fact that the accused is liable, on convic-
tion, for a potentially lengthy term of imprison-
ment or, in the case of an offence that involves, or
whose subject matter is, a firearm, a minimum
punishment of imprisonment for a term of three
years or more.1
There is no inherent or incidental judicial authority in
Canada in relation to the granting or denying of bail.  The
onus to establish that bail should be denied is generally on
the Crown2, but there are situations where the accused per-
son must establish that their release is warranted.3 The
same provisions apply to both.  
Bail hearings are heard in the Provincial Court (or by a
justice of the peace in some provinces) unless the accused is
charged with an offence listed in section 469 of the Crimi-
nal Code.4 If so, the bail hearing is held in the Superior
Court. The list of offences set out in section 469 includes
the offences of murder, treason, piracy, and “alarming Her
Majesty.” 
BAIL REVIEW
If bail is denied in the Provincial Court, an accused per-
son can seek to have this decision reviewed by the Superior
Court of the province. 
In R. v. St-Cloud, 2015 SCC 27, the Supreme Court of
Canada considered the role of a superior court judge in
reviewing a bail decision made by a provincial court judge.
In St-Cloud the accused was denied release by a justice of
the peace. The accused applied for review by a Superior
Court Judge pursuant to section 520 of the Criminal Code.5
The reviewing judge concluded that the accused should be
released on the basis that his detention was not necessary
under section 515(10)(c).  The Crown appealed to the
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6. In R. v. Adem, [2017] 2017 ABCA 242, [2017] CarswellAlta 1310,
para. 27 (Can. Alta.), Oland was considered and the Alberta Court
of Appeal held that Oland suggests that “unless there are other
considerations that call for continued incarceration, including the
seriousness of the offence, residual public safety concerns or
flight risk, the law appears to favour release once an applicant has
established that his appeal clearly surpasses the ‘not frivolous’
hurdle.” 
Supreme Court of Canada.  The appeal was allowed and the
detention order restored.
On the issue of bail review the Supreme Court held that
the exercise of the review power contained within section
520 of the Criminal Code is prescribed and “will be appro-
priate in only three situations” (at paragraph 6):
(1) where there is admissible new evidence; (2) where
the impugned decision contains an error of law; or (3)
where the decision is clearly inappropriate. In the last of
these situations, a reviewing judge cannot simply substi-
tute his or her assessment of the evidence for that of the
justice who rendered the impugned decision. It is only if
the justice gave excessive weight to one relevant factor
or insufficient weight to another that the reviewing
judge can intervene.
The Supreme Court noted, at paragraph 92 of St-Cloud, that
section 520 of the Criminal Code does “not confer an open
ended discretion on the reviewing judge to vary the initial
decision concerning the detention or release of the accused.
Nonetheless, they establish a hybrid remedy and therefore pro-
vide greater scope than an appeal for varying the initial order.”
The Court indicated that section 520 does “not provide for a de
novo hearing” (at paragraph 94).  The Supreme Court con-
cluded that the reviewing judge “does not have the power to
interfere with the initial decision simply because he or she
would have weighed the relevant factors differently,” but a
reviewing judge “may vary the initial decision if that evidence
shows a material and relevant change in the circumstances of
the case” (at paragraph 121).
BAIL ON APPEAL
If an accused person is convicted of an offence he or she
can seek bail in the Provincial Court of Appeal if they have
appealed against conviction or sentence.  Section 679(3) of
the Criminal Code allows a Court of Appeal to grant bail
when an appeal against conviction has been filed in the fol-
lowing circumstances:
In the case of an appeal referred to in paragraph
(1)(a) or (c), the judge of the court of appeal may order
that the appellant be released pending the determination
of his appeal if the appellant establishes that
(a) the appeal or application for leave to appeal is
not frivolous;
(b) he will surrender himself into custody in
accordance with the terms of the order; and
(c) his detention is not necessary in the public
interest.
On March 23, 2017, the
Supreme Court of Canada
released its decision in R. v. Oland,
2017 SCC 17. In Oland the
accused was convicted of second-
degree murder.  He appealed and
applied to the Court of Appeal for
judicial interim release.  His appli-
cation was denied. 
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada it was held that
the accused should have been released by the Court of Appeal.
The Supreme Court considered section 679(3) and concluded
that the appeal court judge (at paragraph 69):
[D]id not apply the correct test in assessing the
strength of Mr. Oland’s appeal and the implications flow-
ing from it. Much as he was satisfied that Mr. Oland had
raised “clearly arguable” grounds of appeal, this was not
enough. . . . [H]is reasons show[], he required more,
something in the nature of unique circumstances that
would have virtually assured a new trial or an acquittal.6
THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT
Reasonable bail in Canada is protected by the Canadian
Constitution. Section 11(e) of the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982,
indicates as follows: “Any person charged with an offence
has the right . . . . (e) not to be denied reasonable bail with-
out just cause.” 
In R. v. Morales, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 711, the Supreme Court
of Canada considered this constitutional requirement and
stated that bail “is not denied for all individuals who pose a
risk of committing an offence or interfering with the admin-
istration of justice while on bail.  Bail is denied only for
those who pose a ‘substantial risk’ of committing an offence
or interfering with the administration of justice, and only
where this ‘substantial likelihood’ endangers ‘the protection
or safety of the public’” (at paragraph 39). 
On June 1st, 2017, the Supreme Court of Canada ren-
dered its judgment in R. v. Antic, 2017 SCC 27, in which it
once again considered section 11(e) of the Charter.  The
Supreme Court indicated that the words “just cause” in sec-
tion 11(e) of the Charter is used in “two contexts” (at para-
graphs 33 and 34):
First, as used in s. 11(e) of the Charter, “just cause”
relates to the circumstances in which denying bail is
constitutional: an accused has a constitutional entitle-
ment to be granted bail unless there is “just cause” to
deny it.
Second, the expression “just cause” is also com-
monly used to describe the statutory grounds that jus-
tify the pre-trial detention of an accused. These






7. In United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987), the Supreme
Court of the United States upheld the constitutionality of the Bail
Reform Act concluding:
In our society, liberty is the norm, and detention prior to
trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception. We
hold that the provisions for pretrial detention in the Bail
Reform Act of 1984 fall within that carefully limited excep-
tion. The Act authorizes the detention prior to trial of
arrestees charged with serious felonies who are found after
an adversary hearing to pose a threat to the safety of indi-
viduals or to the community which no condition of release
can dispel. The numerous procedural safeguards detailed
above must attend this adversary hearing. We are unwilling
to say that this congressional determination, based as it is
upon that primary concern of every government —a con-
cern for the safety and indeed the lives of its citizens—on its
face violates either the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment or the Excessive Bail Clause of the Eighth
Amendment.
grounds, which are enumer-
ated in s. 515(10) of the Code,
are flight risk, public safety
and public confidence in the
administration of justice. In
most cases, it is presumed that
the accused should be
released, and he or she will not
be detained unless the Crown
can show on the basis of these
statutory criteria that deten-
tion is warranted.
The Court stated, at paragraph
40 of Antic, that:
A provision may not deny bail without “just cause[.]”
The right not to be denied bail without just cause
imposes a constitutional standard that must be met for
the denial of bail to be valid. . . . [T]here is just cause to
deny bail only if the denial (1) occurs in a “narrow set of
circumstances” and (2) the denial of bail “is necessary to
promote the proper functioning of the bail system and is
not undertaken for any purpose extraneous to the bail
system.” 
The Court also indicated that (at paragraph 41):7
[The] right not to be denied reasonable bail without
just cause protects accused persons from conditions and
forms of release that are unreasonable. The French ver-
sion of s. 11(e) bears this out: a person charged with an
offence has the right to a release “assortie d’un caution-
nement raisonnable” (“in conjunction with reasonable
bail[.]”) 
REASONABLE BAIL AND CASH DEPOSITS
In Antic, the Supreme Court made a number of comments
concerning the problems caused by requiring an accused per-
son to make a cash deposit to secure their release. The Court
noted that the “central purpose of the Bail Reform Act was to
avoid the harsh effects on accused persons of requiring cash
deposits where other avenues of release are available” (at para-
graph 48). The Supreme Court cautioned against setting the
amount of a surety or cash deposit “‘so high as to effectively
constitute a detention order’” (at paragraph 56). It held that a
bail judge has a “positive obligation ‘to make inquiries into
the ability of the accused to pay’” (at paragraph 56). The
Supreme Court indicated that the requirement for cash can
result in “increased incarceration of accused persons” (at
paragraph 59):
[R]equiring cash as a condition of release has the
potential to result in increased incarceration of accused
persons. Cash bail does not give impecunious persons
greater access to bail. Rather, requiring a cash deposit
will often prevent an accused person from being
released, as it did for many months in Mr. Antic’s case.
Professor Friedland observed in his study that a major-
ity of accused persons who were required to deposit
security as a condition of release were unable to raise the
necessary funds: Detention before Trial, at pp. 130 and
176. An accused person’s release should not be contin-
gent on his or her ability “to marshal[] funds or prop-
erty in advance.”
SECTION 515(10)(C)
As we have seen, section 515(10)(c) of the Criminal
Code allows bail to be denied if it “is necessary to maintain
confidence in the administration of justice.”  In R. v. Hall,
2002 SCC 64, the Supreme Court considered section
515(10)(c) of the Criminal Code.  As we saw earlier the pre-
sent wording of section 515(10)(c) is very specific as
regards the four factors to be considered.  An earlier version
of this section was drafted in much broader terms.  The
wording at the time Hall was decided was as follows (at
paragraph 64):
For the purposes of this section, the detention of an
accused in custody is justified only on one or more of
the following grounds:
. . . .
(c) on any other just cause being shown and without
limiting the generality of the foregoing, where the deten-
tion is necessary in order to maintain confidence in the
administration of justice, having regard to all the cir-
cumstances, including the apparent strength of the pros-
ecution’s case, the gravity of the nature of the offence,
the circumstances surrounding its commission and the
potential for a lengthy term of imprisonment.
The Court’s decision in Hall forced Parliament to enact
the present wording found in section 515(10)(c) because
the Supreme Court of Canada concluded in Hall that the











The judge cannot conjure
up his own reasons for denying
bail; while the judge must look
at all the circumstances, he
must focus particularly on the
factors Parliament has speci-
fied. At the end of the day, the
judge can only deny bail if sat-
isfied that in view of these fac-
tors and related circumstances,
a reasonable member of the
community would be satisfied
that denial is necessary to
maintain confidence in the
administration of justice. . . .
For these reasons, the provision does not authorize a “stan-
dardless sweep” nor confer open-ended judicial discretion.
Rather, it strikes an appropriate balance between the rights
of the accused and the need to maintain justice in the com-
munity. In sum, it is not overbroad.
THE TEST TO BE APPLIED PURSUANT TO SECTION
515(10)(C)
In addition to considering the constitutional status of
section 515(10)(c), the Supreme Court also considered in
Hall how the provision was to be applied by bail judges. The
Supreme Court of Canada indicated, at paragraph 41, that a
judge conducting a bail hearing must before denying release
pursuant to this provision “be satisfied that detention is not
only advisable but necessary.” The Court also indicated in
Hall that the specific factors set out in section 515(10)(c)
“delineate a narrow set of circumstances under which bail
can be denied on the basis of maintaining confidence in the
administration of justice” (at paragraph 40).
After Hall, there were decisions suggesting that Hall had
interpreted 515(10)(c) of the Criminal Code in such a man-
ner that it should be applied sparingly. In R. v. LaFramboise,
[2005] O.J. No. 5785, 2005 CarswellOnt 8335 (Can. Ont.),
for instance, the Ontario Court of Appeal interpreted Hall as
standing for the proposition that section 515(10)(c) should
be used to deny bail “sparingly” and its use “will be justified
only in rare cases” (at paragraph 30). 
However, in St-Cloud, the Supreme Court indicated, at
paragraph 5, that section 515(10)(c) has been “unduly
restricted by the courts in some cases.” It rejected the
proposition that the denial of bail pursuant to section
515(10)(c) of the Criminal Code is “limited to exceptional
circumstances” (at paragraph 54):
In conclusion, the application of s. 515(10)(c) is not
limited to exceptional circumstances, to “unexplainable”
crimes or to certain types of crimes such as murder. The
Crown can rely on s. 515(10)(c) for any type of crime,
but it must prove — except in the cases provided for in
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words “on any other just cause being shown” in the former
section 515(10)(c) of the Criminal Code violated section
11(e) of the Charter were, “void” and therefore “severed”
from the section (see paragraphs 44 and 45). 
“ANY OTHER JUST CAUSE”
In Hall the Court quickly concluded that these words
violated section 11(e) of the Charter and could not be
“saved” by section one.8 The Court summarized its conclu-
sion in the following manner (at paragraph 22):
The first phrase of s. 515(10)(c) which permits denial
of bail “on any other just cause being shown” is uncon-
stitutional. Parliament cannot confer a broad discretion
on judges to grant bail, but must lay out narrow and pre-
cise circumstances in which bail can be denied: Pearson
and Morales, supra. This phrase does not specify any
particular basis upon which bail could be denied. The
denial of bail “on any other just cause” violates the
requirements enunciated in Morales, supra, and there-
fore is inconsistent with the presumption of innocence
and s. 11(e) of the Charter.
“NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN CONFIDENCE IN THE
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE”
However, the Supreme Court reached the opposite con-
clusion in Hall as regards the effect of the words “confidence
in the administration of justice” in section 515(10)(c). The
Court concluded that it is appropriate in particular circum-
stances to deny bail on this basis alone (at paragraph 31):
[A] provision that allows bail to be denied on the
basis that the accused’s detention is required to maintain
confidence in the administration of justice is neither
superfluous nor unjustified. It serves a very real need to
permit a bail judge to detain an accused pending trial for
the purpose of maintaining the public’s confidence if the
circumstances of the case so warrant. Without public
confidence, the bail system and the justice system gener-
ally stand compromised. While the circumstances in
which recourse to this ground for bail denial may not
arise frequently, when they do it is essential that a means
of denying bail be available.
VOID FOR VAGUENESS
The accused in Hall had also argued that the words “con-
fidence in the administration of justice” were unconstitu-
tionally vague. The Court concluded that this portion of
subsection 515(10)(c) provided “an intelligible standard for
debate” and was therefore not void for vagueness (at para-
graph 38). Similarly, these words were held by the Court not
to be overly broad. The Court expressed the basis for this
conclusion in the following manner (at paragraph 41):
8. Section one of the Charter states: “The Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out
in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as
can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.”
Canadian Charter of Rights and freedoms, Part I of the Constitu-
tion Act, 1982. 
The Supreme
Court . . . 
indicated that a
judge . . . must
before denying





s. 515(6) — that the deten-
tion of the accused is justified
to maintain confidence in the
administration of justice.
This constituted a monu-
mental shift in the law of bail
in Canada.  In R. v. A.A.C.,
[2015] 2015 ONCA 483
(Can. Ont.) for instance, the
Ontario Court of Appeal indi-
cated that in St-Cloud, the
Supreme Court rejected “an
unduly restrictive interpreta-
tion of the section’s scope and
holds that the tertiary ground
for detention is not to be
interpreted narrowly or
applied sparingly” (at para-
graph 47).
The Supreme Court also indicated in St-Cloud, at para-
graph 69, that:
The four listed circumstances are simply the main fac-
tors to be balanced by the justice, together with any
other relevant factors, in determining whether, in the
case before him or her, detention is necessary in order to
achieve the purpose of maintaining confidence in the
administration of justice in the country. This is the pro-
vision’s purpose. Although the justice must consider all
the circumstances of the case and engage in a balancing
exercise, this is the ultimate question the justice must
answer, and it must therefore guide him or her in mak-
ing a determination.
Subsequently in Oland, the Supreme Court indicated that
in assessing public confidence concerns pursuant to section
515(10)(c), “the seriousness of the crime plays an important
role. The more serious the crime, the greater the risk that
public confidence in the administration of justice will be
undermined if the accused is released on bail pending trial”
(at paragraph 37).  Similarly in St-Cloud the Supreme Court
concluded (at paragraph 88):  “In conclusion, if the crime is
serious or very violent, if there is overwhelming evidence
against the accused and if the victim or victims were vulner-
able, [pretrial] detention will usually be ordered.”
THE LADDER PRINCIPLE
Sections 515(2)(a) to (e) of the Criminal Code set out the
forms of release available to a judge conducting a bail hearing.
It is often referred to as the “ladder principle” because it begins
with release on “such conditions as the justice directs” and
ends with section 515(2)(e), which allows a bail judge to
order, if the accused is from out of the province or does not
ordinarily reside within two hundred kilometers of the place in
which he or she is in custody, that the accused be released with
sureties and/or a cash deposit. 
In Antic, the Supreme Court of Canada considered this pro-
vision.  In Antic, the accused was charged with several
offences.  He was denied judicial interim release at the trial
level.  On review, the reviewing judge indicated that he would
have released the accused if he could have imposed both a
surety and a cash deposit as release conditions but section
515(2)(e) of the Criminal Code did not apply. On a second
application for review, the bail review judge held that the geo-
graphical limitation in section 515(2)(e) of the Criminal Code
violated the right not to be denied reasonable bail without just
cause under section 11(e) of the Charter. 
The Supreme Court reversed the declaration that section
515(2)(e) of the Criminal Code was unconstitutional.  The
Supreme Court noted that “[s]ection 515(2)(e) did not have
the effect of denying Mr. Antic bail — it was the bail review
judge’s misapplication of the bail provisions that did so”
because “Mr. Antic had offered to provide sureties with a mon-
etary pledge. . . . He could have been released without a cash
deposit” (at paragraphs 3-5).
As regards the “ladder principle,” the Supreme Court indi-
cated in Antic that:
The ladder principle is codified in s. 515(3), which
prohibits a justice or a judge from imposing a more oner-
ous form of release unless the Crown shows why a less
onerous form is inappropriate: “The justice shall not
make an order under any of paragraphs (2)(b) to (e)
unless the prosecution shows cause why an order under
the immediately preceding paragraph should not be
made’” (at paragraph 47).9
The Supreme Court concluded in Antic that the application
judge made two errors (at paragraphs 52 to 54):
First, the bail review judge failed to apply the ladder
principle properly. Although he purported to apply it, he
erred by insisting on cash despite the existence of other
forms of release. The bail review judge was fixated on a
cash deposit because he believed the erroneous assump-
tion that cash is more coercive than a pledge. But, as I
explained above, a recognizance is functionally equiva-
lent to cash bail and has the same coercive effect. The
bail review judge should not have insisted on a cash
deposit where the accused could have entered into a rec-
ognizance with a surety (the effect of which is that the
surety joins in acknowledging the debt to the Crown).
The bail review judge’s second error may in fact have
influenced the first. He expressed concern that the “pull
of bail” would not be strong enough without a cash
deposit. Because the proposed surety was an elderly
96 Court Review - Volume 53 
9. In R. v. Beairsto, 2017 ABCA 254, para. 9 (Can. Alta.), it was held
that the “direction in R. v Antic” that “the bail provisions must be
applied consistently and fairly throughout Canada relates to the
conditions of release, and does not invite comparing the factual
backgrounds of individual cases in determining whether release
should be granted. Every case depends on its own facts.”
“The ladder 
principle . . . 
prohibits a justice








. . . .”
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woman, the bail review judge was concerned that Mr.
Antic might believe that a forfeiture proceeding would
not be taken against her if he breached his bail terms.
The bail review judge erred in making his decision on
the basis of such conjecture. A justice or a judge cannot
impose a more onerous form of release solely because he
or she speculates that the accused will not believe in the
enforceability of a surety or a pledge. The bail system is
based on the promises to attend court made by accused
persons and on their belief in the consequences that will
follow if such promises are broken. As Rosenberg J.A.
rightly observed, “if accused came to believe that they
could fail to attend court without their sureties suffering
any penalty, the surety system would be ineffective.
(Citation omitted.)” 
CONCLUSION
As illustrated the Supreme Court of Canada has considered
numerous aspects of the law of bail in Canada.  The Court has
assessed and explained the constitutional context of bail in
Canada, and it has conclusively set out the manner in which
bail is to be considered by bail judges.  In the long term, the
most significant impact of the Supreme Court of Canada’s deci-
sions on bail may be the importance it has placed upon avoid-
ing pretrial detention based solely on financial means.
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